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Abstract
Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter popularizes the “near-neoclassical” 
demand curve for irrationality. This article attempts to show that there is a demand 
for irrationality at prices higher than zero. This may change policy implications. Many 
instances of consumer behavior, such as paying a premium for locally produced and 
“fair trade” goods, the use of local currencies, and the failure to vaccinate children, 
are other instances of the means-ends irrationality that Caplan observes in political 
markets.
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Introduction
Bryan Caplan’s (2000, 2003, 2007) concept of rational irrationality has 
raised a new important challenge to the economic efficiency of government. 
Rational irrationality opposes Wittman’s (1989) view that democracy is 
efficient by challenging the assumption that voters are not systematically 
irrational. The economic ends that the voting public acts on are not consist-
ent with the popular means of attaining them, such as attempting to attain 
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2 Rationality and Society 
prosperity through protectionism. In framing the debate, Caplan focuses on 
the presence of this form of irrationality only in political markets,1 and pre-
sents one model wherein irrationality disappears when market participants 
are forced to pay any substantial cost to be irrational. This article will argue 
that the psychological forces that sway voters to vote in systematically 
biased ways are also present and readily observable on the market. It will 
thereby demonstrate the need for clarification and revision of Caplan’s the-
oretical underpinnings.2
Caplan’s primary argument is that rational ignorance has poor theoretical 
foundations and must be supplemented by rational irrationality. Eliminating 
one’s irrational beliefs is a painful process few wish to partake in. Since a 
single vote will have no effect on outcomes in democracy, voters rationally 
indulge their irrationalities in such costless contexts. Voters thus choose 
improper means to attain their goals. Among the reasons for this according 
to Caplan is the improper intuition voters have about the economic sphere 
in life. This can be significantly generalized to test whether such behaviors 
exist in other markets, and real-world observation confirms the existence of 
such systematic bias on traditional markets.
Caplan confines his discussion of the underlying psychology to a brief 
section of his book. For the purposes of this article, I assume the results of 
evolutionary psychology. Caplan (2011a, 2011b) has endorsed the use of 
evolutionary psychology3 more extensively elsewhere. The psychological 
theory in question Caplan cites is folk economics. In addition to this, this 
article will consider three closely related concepts: folk biology and the 
naturalistic fallacy, the psychology of moralization, and a modern form of 
conspicuous consumption. In putting these together, we acquire a deeper 
understanding of why individuals want to behave as irrationally in market 
choices as Caplan argues they do while voting.
There are a number of empirical examples of market participants exhib-
iting a willingness-to-pay for such irrationality. These examples will focus 
primarily on a rejection of globalization for reasons that are means-ends 
irrational in the same sense that voting to reject globalization is means-
ends irrational. To buttress this evidence, one other example of such irra-
tionality, the refusal to vaccinate children, is also given. While one may or 
may not desire to call such actions irrational, they are as irrational as voting 
behaviors are, perhaps more so since one must incur real costs to partake in 
behaviors on the market.4 To clarify, these examples may not be as eco-
nomically costly as “traditional” results found in the behavioral economics 
literature, but they are significant enough to question some of the implica-
tions of Caplan’s argument.
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Rational irrationality and the near-neoclassical 
demand curve
Individuals are made to feel negative emotions in response to discovering 
their political worldview is incorrect. On this margin, changing one’s 
mind is an economic “bad.” Avoiding coming to terms with one’s irra-
tional beliefs is therefore a “good” since one avoids such emotions. In 
some contexts, irrational beliefs are costly. However, if one believes tar-
iffs imposed by the government create wealth, little cost is felt by voting 
to express that belief. Since there is almost no chance that an individual’s 
vote will affect the outcome of the election, voting irrationally is a very 
low cost method of partaking in irrationality. It is so low that we should 
expect voters to satiate on their irrationality. While “rational irrationality” 
may be counterintuitive, it directly follows from the painfulness of chang-
ing beliefs and downward-sloping demand curves. The individual is still 
acting “rationally” by maximizing against a constraint, but individuals 
prefer to maintain their prior worldview.
Their worldview informs them of the best means to achieve their 
desired ends. However, instead of a traditionally shaped demand curve, 
Caplan focuses on what he calls a “near-neoclassical” demand curve. 
By this construction, demand slopes down abruptly at the y-axis and 
only at very low prices do market participants demand irrationality 
(Figure 1).
Figure 1. Near-neoclassical demand for irrationality.
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The demand curve is “near-neoclassical” in the sense that the neoclassi-
cal demand for irrationality is the trivial case of a vertical line through the 
y-axis, that is, zero irrationality will be purchased regardless how much it 
costs. But since we observe voters acting irrationally when it is cheap, the 
curve juts out in such a way that individuals are shown to be very irrational 
when irrationality is cheap. Caplan (2000) defends this construction by 
pointing out that it preserves certain results of both neoclassical and behav-
ioral economists (pp. 196–197). He also cites passages from both Bastiat 
and Schumpeter where they appear to make similar arguments (Caplan, 
2007: 134–135).
Often Caplan’s critics have typically objected on philosophical or empir-
ical grounds (Caplan, 2008), as opposed to closely scrutinizing the near-
neoclassical demand curve. Bennett and Friedman (2008) argue that both 
rational irrationality and rational ignorance are contradictory and incoherent 
concepts. Wittman (2008) claims that the differences between the views of 
economists and the views of the public are smaller than Caplan leads the 
reader to believe. On the other hand, Klein (2007, app. 3) offers somewhat 
persuasive evidence that Caplan’s rational irrationality does not differ from 
his antecedent, the theory of expressive voting (Brennan and Lomasky, 
1993) nearly as much as he suggests.5 The question this article addresses is 
how irrational individuals are when confronted with prices for irrationality 
greater than zero.
Theoretical discussion of Caplanian irrationality
[At one point I thought] well, yes, the arguments are right, capitalism is the best 
system, but only bad people would think so. (Robert Nozick)
This section provides the psychological foundation for the irrationalities 
Caplan describes. I focus on three of the four biases Caplan (2007) outlines: 
anti-market bias, antiforeign bias, and pessimistic bias (pp. 30–48).6 In dis-
cussing why these biases are present (Caplan, 2007: 178), Caplan cites evo-
lutionary psychology and Paul Rubin’s (2003) concept of Folk Economics. 
Following Rubin, he argues that humanity’s evolved intuitions about the 
way economies function are biased in such a way that humans see the world 
as a zero-sum game and are suspicious of “outsiders.” This section builds 
off that and three other closely interrelated psychological concepts to show 
that the underlying psychology driving irrationality in voting is readily 
observed in willingness-to-pay in traditional markets. These psychologies 
all share the perspective that the modern world, characterized by science, 
technology, capitalism, and impersonal liberal democracy, is malicious and 
dangerous for human welfare. Anti-market bias, antiforeign bias, and pes-
simistic bias systematically cause the rational ends of private actors to lose 
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their relationship with their means, in the same exact sense as voters are 
systematically biased when voting.
Some of these foundations for rational irrationality may be thought of 
being “rational” in some sense. I do not take a position on whether or not 
these foundations should be thought of as rational, only that they offer expla-
nations for why voters and consumers have systematically biased beliefs in 
Caplan’s sense. If these foundations are to be thought of as rational, then that 
undercuts Caplan’s position, not mine. In other words, to whatever extent 
these explanations may rationalize voting against free trade (etc.), they draw 
into question whether rational irrationality is the correct framework for con-
ceptualizing democracy.7 That itself does not impinge on the thesis of this 
article since defending rational irrationality is not its purpose.
Folk economics
The human mind evolved in a setting with significant differences from the 
modern world and modern economies. Individuals lived in small groups of no 
more than 150 in which all were familiar with one another. Within the group, 
individuals typically cooperated, but groups would often prey on one another. 
Each group had good reason to be suspicious of the intentions of outsiders.
Described by Rubin8 (2003) as “Folk Economics,” this hardwired way of 
thinking makes humans very suspicious of those perceived to be outside the 
group today (as in antiforeign bias). While groups are now perceived to be 
greater than a circle of 150 individuals, such groups still exist, often at the 
level of ethnicity or nation-state. Politicians need not only rely on contribu-
tions from interest groups to support tariffs; individuals are born wanting to 
support measures closing off interaction with “outsiders,” even if the insti-
tutional arrangements have developed today in such a way that such interac-
tions are now mutually beneficial.
Furthermore, according to Rubin, our intuitions also tell us the world is 
a zero-sum game, since we evolved in a context in which there was a fixed 
sum of wealth. If one individual has plenty, it is evidence that it is at the 
expense of others in the group. In a small-group context, it would have been 
individually and collectively rational to ostracize or even violently punish 
those who have more. In a positive-sum setting, where trade allows for both 
individuals to be made better off (even if to different extents), this world-
view is incredibly detrimental to economic outcomes. This is in some ways 
a basis for pessimism bias.
These two hardwired worldviews result in animosity toward free trade. If 
trade makes an outside group (say, China) richer, it must be coming at the 
expense of the inside group (say, the United States). Anecdote or other weak 
justifications will be used to defend this worldview (see Krugman, 1997). 
Our preferences for zero-sum explanations make us uneasy about trade. 
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Unfortunately, as we will eventually see, this skepticism does not limit itself 
to xenophobia; when combined with the other psychological biases in the 
coming sections, it leads to anti-market biases for even the most cosmopoli-
tan among us today.
Folk biology and the naturalistic fallacy
There is another set of evolved intuitions inhibiting our understanding the 
modern world. This is the “Folk Biology” that allows children and other 
untrained individuals to predict and intuit the behaviors and characteristics 
of plants and animals (Atran, 1998). Without training, a great deal of tacit 
knowledge is already present in human beings from the moment we are 
born, as a result of the advantage conferred by such tacit knowledge in the 
evolutionary context. For example, these intuitions effectively tell us 
whether plants and animals are safe or dangerous to consume, how to extract 
substances with medicinal properties, and how to avoid contaminated food.
Again unfortunately, these intuitions do not serve us quite as well in the 
modern context. Because of this, humans equate what is natural with what is 
good (Pinker, 2002: 229–230). For instance, natural foods are assumed to be 
healthier than other foods. This tendency to equate the natural with the good 
is known as the naturalistic fallacy and is a non-sequitur. This systematic 
divergence between means and ends seems sufficient to be labeled irrational 
for purposes here, although whether it counts as irrationality is inessential for 
the point.
This goes against the intuitions of many, so consider a few examples 
from Pinker. The consumption of peanut butter is far more dangerous than 
people realize because peanut butter is surprisingly carcinogenic (Pinker, 
2002: 230). Consuming 40 tablespoons of peanut butter carries the same 
actuarial amount of risk as living 150 years within 20 miles of a nuclear 
power plant or getting one chest x-ray (Viscusi et al., 2005: 695–696 for that 
and other risk equivalencies to consuming peanut butter). But talk of mod-
erating or regulating its consumption is rare because folk biology tells peo-
ple it is safe. Similarly, artificial almond extract is actually far healthier than 
natural almond extract because natural almond extract contains trace 
amounts of arsenic (Pinker, 2002: 231). Consumers give too much credence 
to evidence of the danger of artificial goods, while dismissing concerns over 
goods deemed to be natural.
The psychology of moralization
Pinker (2002: 276) also discusses a strange phenomenon that has taken 
place among the left in recent decades. Various concepts and behaviors, 
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notably sex, have lost their moral connotations among significant segments 
of Western society. While this may rationally follow from various trends of 
liberalization and secularization, it does not follow that other concepts and 
behaviors should gain moral connotations. Yet, as Pinker documents, this is 
exactly what has happened.9
Pinker’s position should be amenable to the thinking of most economists. 
The use and social approval of different goods, services, and choices should 
be weighed by costs, benefits, prudence, and risk. But instead of thinking 
about others’ choices in these terms, modern Westerners have attached 
moral connotations ruling out thinking in such ways. Among Pinker’s 
examples are “‘big box’ retailers,” “fast food,” “fur,” and the “weight of 
fashion models.” (Pinker, 2002; the full list is reproduced in Appendix 1). 
Instead of considering fast food or big box retailers in terms of the costs and 
benefits they confer, the psychology of moralization leads individuals to 
think of these goods lexicographically, even if these preferences are not 
“really” lexicographic. Those who moralize refuse to even acknowledge 
that the tradeoff exists. They do not argue that fast food is unhealthy and 
individuals should moderate their consumption. They argue that fast food is 
immoral and should not exist at all.10
Much of this fits Caplan’s story rather well, but individuals express this 
moral indignation on the private market just as they do in the voting booth. 
If desiring to arbitrarily moralize big box chain stores in the voting booth is 
irrational, so is changing consumption decisions. The empirical examples 
will provide circumstances when this happens.
Conspicuous authenticity
Embedded in human psychology are forms of signaling that serve different 
purposes than conscious goals and desires. As Robert Frank (1988) has 
argued, emotions offer an effective mechanism for securing cooperation in 
a repeated game framework. For instance, subtle emotional mannerisms, 
which are difficult to fake, are a costly signal that only cooperators reliably 
perform. One does not typically consciously signal that one is a “good per-
son.” Instead, actors in this repeated game framework emotionally want 
things that instrumentally signal that they are “good people.” Emotional 
bonuses are what allow a separating equilibrium to arise among cooperators 
and non-cooperators. This argument has since been integrated into the evo-
lutionary psychology of moral sentiments (Ridley, 1998).
However, this leads to certain complications that ultimately result in 
means-ends irrationality. In a similar manner to signaling cooperativeness 
above, Veblenian status-seeking is also an important component of human 
psychology, as status confers many benefits in the evolutionary context 
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(Sundie et al., 2011). Therefore, there is an evolutionary incentive to signal 
high status, even if one is not consciously aware of it (just as a peacock need 
not be consciously signaling for its tail to be an effective signal of quality). 
Individuals emotionally want goods that connote status, without knowing 
that is why they want them. However, traditional conspicuous consumption 
(e.g. wearing gaudy jewelry), the original consumer method of seeking-
status, has fallen into disrepute and no longer connotes genuine status. 
“Good” people do not partake in conspicuous consumption, but there are 
more subtle methods of seeking-status.
Potter (2010: 103–135) argues that there are many goods in modern soci-
ety matching this logic. While earlier generations used gaudy jewelry and 
enormous mansions to signal status, modern Westerners purchase “authen-
tic” goods that in practice function as conspicuous consumption, a consump-
tion pattern he calls “conspicuous authenticity.” Instead of seeking status by 
showing off their wealth, elites now seek “authentic” goods that demonstrate 
their rejection of mass consumerism, capitalism, and technology:
This form of status-seeking emerged out of the critique of mass society as it 
was picked up by the 1960s counterculture, and as it became the dominant 
status system of urban life, we saw the emergence of what we can call “rebel” 
or “hip” consumerism. The rebel consumer goes to great lengths to show that 
he is not a dupe of advertising, that he does not follow the crowd, expressing 
his politics and his individuality through the consumption of products that have 
a rebellious or out-of-the-mainstream image—underground bands, hip-hop 
fashions, skateboarding shoes. (p. 121)
These goods are costly both in terms of raw financial cost and as lifestyle 
changes that are extravagant in their rejection of extravagance. Potter com-
piles a litany of examples of behaviors, some of which I will discuss below. 
See Appendix 2 for Potter’s compilation of goods recently marketed as 
authentic.
Individuals unconsciously pursuing status this way may not like to think of 
their behavior as status-seeking. But few who engaged in conspicuous con-
sumption ever thought of themselves as crassly pursuing status. “Remember, 
it is essential to the pretences of the upper classes that their activities of con-
spicuous leisure must be superficially useful” (p. 120). Modern status-seeking 
successfully signals status because it goes against what members of society 
think of as conspicuous consumption. “Status-seeking never disappears—
when it is exposed to the light, it simply scurries away and hides until it can 
transform itself into a subtler and less obvious form” (p. 125). Those practic-
ing conspicuous authenticity really believe what they are doing really is good 
and respectable, but this is where the issue arises.
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If conspicuously authentic consumers are purchasing “authentic” goods 
to achieve status, they are duplicitous; their implied altruistic motives do 
not match their actual aims. But if they honestly purchase goods that have 
an appearance of morality but serve no real moral purpose, they are means-
ends irrational. They are led by their emotions to genuinely want such 
goods, but the goods do not serve the moral purposes they believe the goods 
serve. For instance, consumers may be emotionally drawn to locally pro-
duced goods because they are what respectable, high-status people pur-
chase, so it signals they are high-status as well. The story that goods sold at 
Walmart suck wealth out of the community and destroy the environment 
offers the appearance of morality. The story is the conscious (but irrational) 
reason why conspicuously authentic consumers buy local. But the underly-
ing, unconscious motivation is the quest for status.11
Folk Economics, The Naturalistic Fallacy, The Psychology of 
Moralization, and Conspicuous Authenticity can be tied together to present 
a coherent theoretical backing to both Caplan’s voter irrationality and irra-
tionality that may be found elsewhere in the world. Humans are intrinsically 
anti-market, antiforeign, and excessively pessimistic. The modern world is 
not seen as a positive for human welfare. The benefits of exchange are 
downplayed both because natural intuitions tell us that interactions are zero-
sum and that we should be suspicious of those outside the group we identify 
with. “Natural” is equated with “good,” making us unnecessarily suspicious 
of the artificial modern world. Folk economics and folk biology create an 
intuitive paradigm that human beings are uncomfortable leaving. Moreover, 
when the modern world became secularized, the psychology that previously 
led individuals to moralize against sin now leads individuals to moralize 
against actions, behaviors, and goods which contradict scientifically incor-
rect folk economics and folk biology. One way of doing this is voting 
against free trade, as Caplan argues. However, another way of satisfying 
these irrationalities is to conspicuously purchase goods that affirm one’s 
position as a high-status, “authentic” person untainted by the evils of capi-
talism. The remainder of this article will provide examples of the existence 
of a willingness-to-pay for such goods.
Examples of willingness-to-pay for rejecting 
globalization on private markets
Because Caplan cites protectionism frequently as voter irrationality, we 
start with three examples of consumers rejecting globalization on private 
markets. To make these examples convincing, I make the case that (a) they 
contain elements of moralizing behavior, folk economics, the naturalistic 
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fallacy, and/or conspicuous authenticity, (b) they are means-ends irrational, 
and (c) individuals are willing to pay some non-trivial amount for them. 
With these elements in place, they follow a similar or identical motivation 
as voting for protectionism, but they do not lie on the near-neoclassical 
demand curve for irrationality.
Before detailing these examples precisely, I also want to move the reader 
to ask exactly what one would expect to observe if we lived in a world 
where the near-neoclassical demand for irrationality holds. The examples 
provided here contradict straightforward interpretations of what that entails. 
One can argue certain behaviors are small deviations, but they do not fit the 
curvature of the near-neoclassical demand curve. One may also posit alter-
native rationales for purchasing such goods, but that will always be possi-
ble, and is equally possible for Caplan’s examples in political markets. 
Indeed, Caplan (2012) informally admitted that demand for organic food 
contradicts the near-neoclassical demand curve, as alluded to earlier, and 
that case was not explicated here because the case against organic is weaker 
than the following examples.
Ineffective private methods for curtailing global warming
Global warming is a serious problem for political economists, environmen-
tal economists, and policymakers in the 21st century. Yet, while policymak-
ers should examine different methods of eliminating this externality, much 
of the public moralizes this issue. Certain solutions, especially those that 
curtail consumption and globalization, are preferred to those solutions 
which are less economically costly for today’s consumer.
One figure in this debate is Bjorn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical 
Environmentalist (2001) and Cool It (2007). In his more recent book, 
Lomborg uses data from the United Nations and cost-benefit analysis to 
argue that global resources are better spent first to solve other more pressing 
human problems. Alternative aid efforts are more likely to save lives (per 
dollar of sacrifice) than what was then being internationally debated regard-
ing global warming. This did not deny the existence of global warming, or 
that it was a problem. Rather, it acknowledged the existence of tradeoffs 
when allocating scarce resources among competing ends. His critics claim 
that this provides “cover to politicians, climate-change deniers, and corpora-
tions that don’t want any part of controls on greenhouse emissions” (Begley, 
2010). While reasonable analysts may disagree on methodology and fact, 
Lomborg asked an economic question that needed to be asked by policymak-
ers. Attempts at vilifying Lomborg for scientific dishonesty12—these 
attempts referred to by The Economist as “incompetent and shameful”—
were eventually annulled by Denmark’s Ministry of Science, Technology, 
and Innovation (The Economist, 2003).
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Respected economists who have little interest in fighting environmental-
ist groups have been vilified as well. Levitt and Dubner (2009) in their pop-
ular book Superfreakonomics argue for a geo-engineering solution to global 
warming, one that would release sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere at a 
lower cost than methods which would actively curtail carbon emissions. 
Even though Levitt and Dubner were arguing a method whose intention was 
to reduce global temperatures, environmentalists labeled them global warm-
ing deniers. “The critics are implying that we dismiss any threats from 
global warming; but the entire point of our chapter is to discuss global-
warming solutions, so obviously that’s not the case” (Levitt, 2009). Levitt 
and Dubner’s suggestion may have merit or may not, but creating an alter-
native solution that would not necessitate that the West cut its emissions is 
moralistically vilified.
Political gridlock has led many to take action in their own lives to miti-
gate their own impact on climate change. However, the effect of these meas-
ures, which are appealing intuitively, is very difficult to gauge, as 
documented by Harford (2011: 167–177). In London, the carbon footprint 
of driving a car with the typical 1.6 passengers is probably better for the 
environment (per person) than the effect of riding a bus with its typical 13 
passengers (Harford, 2010). It is better to throw an old light bulb in the trash 
and replace it with an energy efficient light bulb than to wait for the old one 
to burn out. A single error of forgetting to turn off one’s work computer for 
a night can wipe out all the carbon-conscious behaviors over the course of a 
day. As Harford argues, this is an issue because there are no prices, so only 
with difficulty are there approximately accurate estimates of their environ-
mental impact.
Perhaps the most ineffective and best documented case of these private 
measures is the locavore movement. While locavores have a number of rea-
sons for arguing local is better,13 one of these reasons is to curtail global 
warming:
By choosing local produce, you can reduce fuel consumption and global 
warming pollution associated with transporting food, help lift your local 
agricultural communities, strengthen the local economy, and protect the 
environment—all by eating fresher, tastier fruits and vegetables. (Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 2007)
The concept of food miles has become common as a measure of how far 
one’s food has traveled. But this measure has been rejected as a useful con-
cept by those who have investigated the issue. Systematic economic analy-
sis offers little support for the environmental claims of locavores (Chi et al., 
2009; Cowen, 2012; Desrochers and Shimizu, 2012; Glaeser, 2011; Lusk 
and Norwood, 2011; McWilliams, 2009):
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When we survey the expansive literature supporting the food-miles approach, 
one thing becomes evident: the prevailing arguments for stressing food miles is 
driven less by concrete evidence than by a vague quest to condemn globalization. 
In this respect, buying local is a political act with ideological implications. 
(McWilliams, 2009: 30)14
Food miles represents the same anti-globalization sentiments Caplan 
observes among voters in the United States.
Compared to production and other factors, transportation does not take up 
a significant amount of the carbon expended to get food to plate. Other fac-
tors frequently outweigh the carbon expended by sending ships across the 
globe. This is severe enough for locavorism to actually be counterproduc-
tive. Locavorism also dismisses economies of scale, which may allow large 
commercial firms to have smaller carbon footprints per unit; buying local 
“causes an increase in the quantity of inputs demands, which increases car-
bon intensity, and an increase in the price of commodities and food products” 
(Sexton, 2009). Many such instances are summarized by Ridley (2010):
Getting food from farmer to the shop causes just 4 per cent of all its lifetime emissions. 
Ten times as much carbon is emitted in refrigerating British food as in air-freighting 
it from abroad, and fifty times as much is emitted by the customer travelling to the 
shops. A New Zealand lamb, shipped to England, requires one quarter as much 
carbon to get on to a London plate as a Welsh lamb; a Dutch rose, grown in a heated 
greenhouse and sold in London, has six times the carbon footprint of a Kenyan rose 
grown under the sun using water recycled through a fish farm, using geothermal 
electricity and providing employment for Kenyan women. (pp. 41–42)
Eating local may be counterproductive in reducing carbon emissions for 
private individuals seeking to do so.
Measures which may have a positive effect on locavores’ desire to reduce 
carbon emissions are less emotionally appealing than calls to eat local. 
McWilliams (2009) calls instead for reducing consumption of land animals 
as a method an individual may pursue to cut carbon; politically, he endorses 
judiciously regulated free trade and ending perverse subsidies. Cowen 
(2012: 179–181) is more skeptical that individual measures may have a 
discernible impact and instead favors a carbon tax (as does Harford [2011: 
180–196]). But, setting the Pigouvian tax correctly makes this merely a 
measure of prudence, not a moral cause to fight for.
Multiple commentators have also referred to buying local as an act of 
conspicuous consumption:
Locally sourced food has surely brought considerable benefits to many individuals 
and communities, and for the consumer at least, it allows for an easy gesture. 
In this sense, buying local has evolved into a ‘lite green’ act of conspicuous 
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consumption that offers environmentalists otherwise deeply involved in a 
commercialized life an easy way to register their discontent with the excesses of 
modernity. (McWilliams, 2009: 30)
Potter (2010) identifies it as one of the primary examples of conspicuous 
authenticity (pp. 130–133). He documents an arms race among locavores 
limiting the radius of the origins of their food; one family sought to have 
zero impact on the environment. These extremes, Potter notes, “are totally 
disconnected from any actual environmentally sound agenda.”
There has been work done estimating willingness-to-pay for local foods. 
While it is difficult to directly disentangle to what extent this willingness-
to-pay is rational (e.g. the belief that local foods are of superior quality) 
rather than means-ends irrational reasons, this is the data we have available. 
Darby et al. (2008) estimates a utility function to determine the premium 
that may be obtained for local products over products from elsewhere in the 
United States. There are four estimates, two for grocery stores and two for 
direct markets, with an estimate for both a deterministic and a stochastic 
measure of compensating variation. This is reproduced in Table 1.
A literature review was also performed by Park and Gómez (2012) on 
percent price premiums on a number of several different goods. The authors 
collect the results of several estimated price premiums for local produce. 
They also perform their own survey and provide these results. The literature 
review is provided in Table 2, and the survey is provided in Table 3.
Table 1. Willingness-to-pay estimates ($/Package) for local over US Foods.
Estimate WTP per Package
Grocery stores (deterministic) US$0.67
Grocery stores (stochastic) US$0.48
Direct markets (deterministic) US$1.18
Direct markets (stochastic) US$0.92
This is Table 6 from Darby et al. (2008).
Table 2. The willingness-to-pay for various local products.
Product Premium
Colorado potatoes  9%
Ohio strawberries 27%
Michigan greens 36%
South Carolina produce 27%
South Carolina animal products 23%
Florida fresh produce 50%
Pennsylvania applesauce 31%
This is Table 1 from Park and Gómez (2012).
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The mean of the percent increase in willingness-to-pay for the products 
in the meta-study is 29%. Upon inclusion of the willingness-to-pay of the 
products in the Park and Gómez study, the mean is 22.4%. To simplify, the 
price premium placed on local goods is assumed to be 20%.
This can be used to estimate the total price premium paid by locavores 
who purchase all food locally.15 Zepeda and Nie (2012) have identified vari-
ous characteristic that increase the likelihood of someone to purchase local 
food. Among those is a tendency for these consumers not to be poor.16 
Finally, per the 2010 weights, the relative importance of food and beverages 
is 14.79% for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and 16.40% (CPI-W) for wage 
earners and clerical workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.). Suppose that 
the moderately affluent locavore makes US$60,000 per year and spends a 
20% price premium on local foods over the baseline food and beverage 
weight of 15% of her budget. Or
WTP income of income spent on food price premium= × ×%
WTP = ×( )×US$ , . ( . )60 000 0 15 0 20
Under these assumptions, the consumer spends US$1800 on local. This 
is a non-trivial portion of economic decision-making in such individuals’ 
lives.
Those with a concern for the environment take action in their private 
lives to curtail the effects of global warming, even while rejecting the alter-
native solutions that may be less costly. Of the many ways they have tried 
reducing their carbon footprint, buying local has an extensive literature 
detailing its ineffectiveness—or even counterproductiveness—in achieving 
the ends locavores hope to achieve. The documentation of its close connec-
tion with moralizing and distaste for the modern global economy is wide-
spread. Multiple social commentators have independently determined that 
locavorism is a modern example of conspicuous consumption. Ultimately, 
the price paid for partaking in such irrationality is not cheap, sometimes in 







This is Table 2 from Park and Gómez (2012).
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the magnitude of thousands of dollars per year. The act of buying local to 
reduce carbon footprints contradicts the near-neoclassical demand curve for 
irrationality.
Fair trade coffee
Certain retailers now offer goods (especially coffee) labeled as “fair trade.” 
These goods cost more, but they promise to provide better wages for the 
impoverished farmers growing the coffee:
Today, Fair Trade is a global effort. Consumers can enliven developing countries, 
relieve exploitation and promote environmental sustainability by purchasing Fair 
Trade-labeled tea, cocoa, fruits, vegetables, herbs, spices, sugar, honey, wine, 
flowers, grains and rubber products. (Fair Trade USA, 2010)
One commentator has referred to this as “expressing convictions at the 
mall” and “latte activism,” a way to act on one’s beliefs outside the political 
sphere (Giridharadas, 2009). But when these convictions are anti-market 
and anti-globalization, they lead to actions inconsistent with the meaning 
and benefits of markets. The actions do not achieve the stated ends—help-
ing the poor receive a just wage—of purchasing fair trade coffee, but indi-
viduals are willing to pay for them.
The limits of fair trade are well documented (Berndt, 2007; Henderson, 
2008; Claar and Haight, 2015; Sidwell, 2008). The extra money goes to cof-
fee grown in middle-income countries, not poor countries, with no mecha-
nism of getting the money to the workers at the lowest rung of the latter. The 
preeminent fair trade organization, Fair Trade USA, requires that farmers 
form cooperatives to participate and these cooperatives receive the funds, 
not the farmers directly. Many of the labor market protections that Fair 
Trade USA advertises it enforces on participants are duplications of the 
regulations already in place in these countries. Other regulations are too 
vague to enforce with reliability. The gains actually made available for 
farmers are either “eaten up by the co-operative bureaucracy” or “absorbed 
in administrative and investment costs,” depending on how it is thought of 
(Haight and Henderson, 2010). The extent to which the money reaches indi-
vidual farmers is impossible to determine, since Fair Trade USA refuses to 
share this information and provides anecdotal data instead (Griffiths, 2010). 
Ultimately, if fair trade has an impact on the lives of Latin American coffee 
growers, fair trade is shifting production from desperately poor areas such 
as Africa to middle-income countries that are less in need.
While the connection between the suspicion of free trade and the belief 
in fair trade is straightforward, it may be more surprising that some scholars 
have already labeled fair trade coffee conspicuous consumption:
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Think of fair-trade products as a type of luxury good. Many people consume 
luxury goods in order to signal their fabulousness to others. Fair-trade consumers 
have their own sense of what fabulousness entails: a firm commitment to 
conservation, poverty alleviation, and the empowerment of developing-world 
producers - or maybe they simply like the labels. (Boudreaux, 2011)
Highly agreeable and conscientious consumers now try to buy recycled computer-
printer paper at a 40 percent premium above virgin paper, or purchase shade 
grown Fair Trade Coffee at $12 a point rather than Wal-Mart generic coffee at $3 
a pound. Conspicuously ethical consumption is certainly one potent way to 
improve the world […]. (Miller, 2009)
One scholar in the marketing literature has explicitly lamented that it is 
now commonplace to seek status through supposedly “ethical consump-
tion,” which includes fair trade (Allison, 2009). While interpreting the true 
motives of consumers will always present difficulties, fair trade is an equally 
strong example as those that Potter provides.
A number of studies already exists which measure willingness-to-pay for 
fair trade coffee. One American survey estimates a premium of US$0.2164 
per pound (Loureiro and Lotade, 2005). A more recent survey suggests 75% 
of Americans are willing to pay an extra US$0.50 per pound, while 50% are 
willing to pay an extra US$1 (Hertel et al., 2009). Using a hedonic method, 
other researchers found the premium to be roughly 11% (or .0258 Euros per 
gram) in the British market, and argue that their studies and related “envi-
ronmental/fair trade products” are consistently between 5% and15% 
(Galarraga and Markandya, 2004). At the high end, this premium was found 
to be 38% in Sweden also when using hedonic pricing methods (Schollenberg, 
2012). Lastly, a Belgian survey measured that the average willingness-to-
pay is 10%, while 10% were willing to pay the current premium of 27% (De 
Pelsmacker et al., 2005). The FAS branch of the USDA has published data 
that in 2000 (FAS/USDA, 2000), Americans averaged purchasing 7.9 pounds 
of coffee per year. Assuming US$0.20 per pound as average willingness-to-
pay, this is US$1.58 per person. This is the smallest WTP of the estimates 
found in this article, but keep in mind this is a single good. Moreover, when 
scaled to 300 million people (as is correct to do; remember this is the aver-
age WTP among everyone), this amounts to US$474 per million dollars per 
year if all consumers expressed their WTP.17
Local currencies
Various localities have created local currencies designed to keep money in 
the communities. Among these are the Berkshares, the Ithaca Hours, the 
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Detroit Cheers, the Lewes Pound, the Totnes Pound, and the many Local 
Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) (see Pacione, 1997; Swann and Witt, 
1997). There are various stated reasons for using local currencies, and a 
consistent theme is that avoiding buying goods from outside the community 
will increase the community’s wealth.
While each of the local currencies has its own peculiarities, they all 
emphasize the value of keeping money in the community. The organization 
coordinating Berkshares convinces consumers to use them by getting mer-
chants to accept them with a 5% discount,18 but the stated motivation for 
doing so is mercantile:
By accepting BerkShares merchants are helping to establish markets for locally 
made products, providing an incentive for the growth of home-based industries 
and creating opportunities for those underemployed and unemployed to turn 
latent skills into business ventures. (Berkshares, Inc., n.d.)
As is the case with the Ithaca Hours:
Ithaca HOURS is our local currency. It keeps money local, building our local 
economy. It builds community pride and connections. (Ithaca Hours, Inc., n.d.)
And the Lewes Pound:
Money spent locally circulates within, and benefits the local economy. Money 
spent in national chains doesn’t. The Lewes Pound encourages demand for local 
goods and services. In turn this builds resilience to the rising costs of energy, 
transport and food. (The Lewes Pound CIC, n.d.)
Similar statements can be found regarding the Detroit Cheers (Bello, 
2009) and LETS (Croft and Rowell, n.d.). The Green Party, in fact, has local 
currencies as part of their official 2010 platform to increase economic jus-
tice and sustainability (Green Party of the United States, n.d.). Keeping 
money in the community is a key aspect of why these local currencies are in 
the place.
Of course, this goes against economic orthodoxy. At best, the benefits of 
these local currencies are sociological, but the economic benefits do not 
exist (Harford, 2008). Money exiting the community, even if it gets chan-
neled through corporations, will eventually return to the community through 
the basic logic of supply and demand. At worst, a sudden change may result 
in mild disinflation should the total quantity of money in the community 
fall. However, the supply side effects of the local currencies may be larger 
and perverse. In keeping out outside firms, resources are misallocated from 
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their most efficient uses. In doing so, worker productivity is diminished and 
the community is made poorer, as worker productivity is the driver of long-
run economic growth.
There may be many reasons for wanting to buy local goods. One may 
value the presence of local businesses for the sake of it (i.e. “small is good”) 
or because the local business may be perceived to give friendlier service. 
But these are purposes apart from the belief that buying local will have such 
benefits. The purpose of the local currencies is to shift more production to 
local, above and beyond what is in individuals’ underlying interests, out of 
the false belief that doing so is beneficial for the community. It is in this 
sense that it is means-ends irrational.
WTP is muddled in these cases, made worse by the presence of the dis-
count to encourage the use of the local currencies. It is best thought of as 
restricting available consumption bundles from some optimum. The preva-
lence of large corporations demonstrates their benefits, and eliminating 
their goods and services from consumption bundles is evidence of loss. The 
loss of income which results from failing to partake in gains from trade is 
economically equivalent to WTP. In Appendix 3, I estimate this to be 
US$462 per person under one set of assumptions.
In all three of these examples, consumers use resources out of their 
own pockets to support solutions to globalization that are no more rational 
than protectionism. The underlying psychology driving individuals to pro-
tectionism is the same underlying psychology driving individuals to be 
willing to pay for these initiatives. Locavorism, under one parameteriza-
tion, costs thousands of dollars per year per person. Surveys and models 
suggest that fair trade goods will trade at a 5%–15% premium, perhaps 
more, and the average American is willing to pay at least US$0.20 extra 
per pound of coffee. Local currencies represent individuals consciously 
taking measures to avoid the productivity-enhancing division of labor out 
of a belief that outside businesses seep wealth out the community (and 
into the pockets of an outgroup). The near-neoclassical demand curve for 
irrationality does not hold when consumers are confronted with globaliza-
tion in private markets.
Other examples of willingness-to-pay for 
irrationality on private markets
The willingness-to-pay for other means-ends irrational behaviors that do 
not directly deal with globalization may also be documented. The best 
example is the failure to vaccinate children.19 Fears of vaccination go back 
to when vaccinations first appeared. Historically, these fears never had any 
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merit (Poland and Jacobson, 2011). Distrust of vaccines has seen a recent 
increase, resulting in jumps in the incidences of diseases that had long been 
defeated by modern medicine (Gangarosa et al., 1998). This distrust is justi-
fied with poor reasoning (Jacobson et al., 2007). Per the naturalistic fallacy, 
among the reasons for the distrust for vaccines is that they are not “natural” 
(Offit, 2011: 116–117; Poland and Jacobson, 2001). As satirist Christian 
Lander has written,
For a few years now, [affluent Westerners] have been resisting the idea of getting 
their children vaccinated against the diseases that brought suffering to millions and 
were wiped out by modern medicine. Their logic follows a number of paths. The 
first is a need to get back to our natural state, specifically the one that is vulnerable 
to the diseases that killed off many of our ancestors. (Lander, 2010: 139)
Much of today’s concerns with vaccines centers around a belief in the 
relationship between vaccination and autism. The study that appeared origi-
nally in the top medical journal The Lancet was fraudulent. This has been 
known for many years (Offit, 2008). The Lancet eventually retracted the 
article altogether (The Editors of The Lancet, 2010). Following the original 
article, an extensive literature discredited any connection between autism 
and vaccinations. The mainstream scientific community studying autism 
approves of this literature. For instance, on its website, the Autism Science 
Foundation (2012) has compiled the scientific literature for parents inter-
ested in reading the science, introducing it by stating, “There is no data to 
support an autism vaccine link. There never has been. Vaccines don’t cause 
autism.”
Even with the original article discredited, vaccination rates are falling in 
many places. Rates of vaccinated children within parts of the states of 
Washington, Oregon, Vermont, and California have fallen below the criti-
cal levels of 85%–95% that prevent outbreaks from occurring (The 
Economist, 2012; see also Rho, 2013). Parents are incurring a real risk by 
failing to vaccinate. Bearing this risk is equivalent to expressing a willing-
ness-to-pay for satisfying the irrationality of rejecting the work of modern 
science. Parents thereby reveal that they value holding this belief more 
than eliminating an actuarial risk to the lives of their children. To be clear, 
the WTP estimates derived here apply to people living in the United States, 
not in poorer areas of the world where refusing vaccination would be an 
even costlier decision.
There is already a literature on parents’ willingness-to-pay for the value 
of a statistical life of their children. Many of these diseases do not often kill 
children, but there is a literature on the value of statistical illness profiles, 
with estimations for a profile of 1 year of sickness with recovery. There have 
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also been studies determining the increased morbidity of those who are not 
vaccinated. By putting these measures together, we can construct estimates 
of parents’ willingness-to-pay.
Hunt and Ortiz (2006) have reviewed the literature on parents’ revealed 
preference for the value of the statistical lives of children. They summarize this 
in terms of Euros and also provide the ratio of the value of statistical lives of 
the children versus the parents. Among their findings is that parents are willing 
to pay more for their children’s safety than their own safety. Of the nine studies 
they examined, the range of the valuation of the statistical life spanned 
78,000 Euros to 11.7 million Euros.20 Unfortunately, most of the studies have 
their own idiosyncrasies which prevent a clean way to average them together. 
On the other hand, the ratios of WTP for statistical lives of children to WTP for 
statistical lives of parents range are 0.6:1, <1:1, 1.1:1, 2:1, 2:1, and 6:1. I pro-
vide estimates of WTP based on ratios of 1:1, 1.5:1, and 2:1.
A 45-year-old individual with a 5% discount rate and an income of 
US$42,000 is willing to pay US$2.21 to avoid a 1/1,000,000 chance of 
1 year of sickness (with no risk of mortality) at some point in the future 
(DeShazo and Cameron, 2008). Inflating this to 2014 dollars yields 
US$2.43.21 This result appears to be robust for the purposes here.22 For a 
point of reference, Viscusi et al. (2005: 729) puts the median estimate of the 
value of a statistical life at US$7.0 million. In these terms, 1 year of sickness 
with certainty but no risk of mortality is US$2.43 million. After adjusting 
for the range of ratios of WTP for children, this works out to US$2.43 mil-
lion, US$3.645 million, and US$4.86 million.
Recent morbidity in United States of pertussis (whooping cough) was 
4.18 per 100,000 in 2008 (CDC, 2008b). Writing in Pediatrics, Glanz et al. 
(2009) calculates that individuals are 23 times more likely to catch pertussis 
without vaccination. The morbidity in the United States of invasive pneu-
mococcal disease (after the introduction of the PCV7 vaccine in 2000) fell 
to 23.4 per 100,000 as of 2005 of children under 5 (CDC, 2008a). Glanz 
et al. (2011) calculates that the parental refusal of the PCV7 vaccines results 
in 6.5 times higher likelihood of hospitalization from invasive pneumococ-
cal disease. The hospitalizations due to varicella (chickenpox), after the 
vaccine was introduced fell to 1.3 per 100,000 by 2001 (Davis et al., 2004). 
Glanz et al. (2010) calculates refusal of the vaccine will result in a varicella 
infection requiring medical care to increase ninefold.23
The estimated cost of refusing vaccination follows
WTP WTPtoavoid yr sickness premium for child
increase in probab
= × ×1
ility of yr of sickness1
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See Table 4 for the derived estimates of willingness-to-pay. For instance, 
WTP for refusing the invasive pneumococcal disease vaccine under the 
1.5:1 assumption is
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The partial effect of other vaccines cannot always be confidently esti-
mated, but they too have discernible effects; in one recent outbreak of the 
measles in the United States, 89% cases (105 out of 118) were of unvacci-
nated people (CDC, 2011). The financial magnitudes of the diseases for 
which data are available are far from trivial, even if every vaccination is not 
evaluated.
Table 4. WTP for Refusing Vaccinations of Children.
Disease Ratio of Value of child’s to parent’s 
statistical life in terms of WTP
 1:1 1.5:1 2:1
Percussis (whooping cough) US$2,234 US$3,351 US$4,464
Invasive pneumococcal disease US$3,127 US$4,690 US$6,255
Varicella (chicken pox) US$253 US$379 US$506
Using the median assumption that parents value the statistical life of 
their children 50% more than they value their own lives, the cost implicit in 
not vaccinating for these three diseases is US$8,420. As pointed out earlier, 
as many as ten percent of families exhibit this willingness-to-pay—and they 
do so repeatedly should they have more than one child. Under the influence 
of retracted evidence, thousands of parents retreat to the naturalistic fallacy, 
rejecting modern medicine they deem to be artificial.
Conclusion
Contrary to the near-neoclassical demand curve, individuals demonstrate a 
willingness-to-pay for irrational means. All four examples discussed in this 
article are off the demand curve Caplan specifies. These examples are 
graphed in Figure 2 for a point of comparison.24
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Once we look critically at what leads people to form these opinions, 
rational irrationality can be seen in all facets of life. Humans have an innate 
intuitive sense of how economies and the natural world function, and when 
the modern world comes into conflict with that intuition, they moralize 
against it. This explains why citizens reject free trade and why they as con-
sumers are also willing to pay to reject globalization and fail to vaccinate 
their children. These are not marginal cases. Individuals are spending thou-
sands of dollars per year on such things.
One solution Caplan calls for is more economic education. This article 
is consistent with such a prescription. But in addition to that, both econo-
mists and intelligent laypeople are urged to popularize the mainstream 
positions from economics and the natural sciences taken in this article. 
Economic education may struggle to sway the median voter; it may only 
move those with roughly correct priors regarding economic questions 
towards a more consistent, factual worldview. On the other hand, for each 
and every person convinced to vaccinate their children, the world is made 
better off. Some may dismiss these prescriptions, but they may have far 
more practical effect. Convince 300 individuals that free trade is good, 
the chance this changes trade policy is vanishingly small. Convince 300 
individuals to vaccinate their children, and society tangibly improves. 
When it comes to persuasion on private markets, unlike politics, every-
one is the marginal decision-maker for the irrationality present in their 
own lives.
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Notes
 1. His examples outside of modern political markets are religious acts and behav-
iors of bureaucrats in Marxist regimes.
 2. Caplan (2012) has stated in an informal context the empirical possibility of 
such irrationality appearing on the market. This article will more systemati-
cally make the case while demonstrating its close relationship to psychological 
factors.
 3. Technically, he endorses behavioral genetics in these contexts, but these fields 
are closely related.
 4. What is key to my argument is that one cannot define what individuals do 
on the market to be rational because they are acting on the market. Doing so 
would strip Caplan’s theory of much of its empirical content.
 5. In this article, I abstract from the question of how distinct rational irrationality 
and expressive voting are. The examples below were targeted specifically due 
to their parallels with Caplan’s examples. If they can also be thought to be in 
parallel with expressive voting (as in, value-expressive consumption, cf. Johar 
and Sirgy, 1991), then this article provides further evidence that rational irra-
tionality and expressive voting are empirically indistinguishable.
 6. The fourth, make-work bias, which does not fit as cleanly, may have differ-
ent psychological foundations, although Caplan does emphasize technological 
unemployment in this context.
 7. As before, if any of these behaviors may also be thought of as being expressive, 
then so do Caplan’s examples of voting behavior.
 8. In addition to the 2003 article, see also Rubin (2002) for a more detailed expo-
sition on political economy and modern evolutionary psychology. It should 
also be noted that the concept of folk economics was anticipated by Hayek 
(1978, 1988).
 9. In addition to Pinker, see also Eberstadt (2009) for a reflection on the “curious 
reversal in moralizing” from the moralization of sex to the moralization of food.
10. See, for example, Foods4BetterHealth (2014).
11. A story closer to Frank’s (1988)—the use of difficult-to-fake emotions to signal 
a willingness to cooperate—may also hold. However, a parallel problem arises. 
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If the person buys local to consciously signal willingness to cooperate, the per-
son is being duplicitous. If the person who buys local is emotionally drawn to 
buying local out of the belief that it is good for society, and in doing so happens 
to signal willingness to cooperate, the person’s expressed desires are means-
ends irrational. Depending on how one phrases the question and thinks about 
human rationality, this may or may not be considered “rational.” But again, if 
that is the case, it cuts against Caplan no more and no less than it cuts against 
my position.
12. Albeit, this was for the earlier publication that was more agnostic regarding the 
existence of global warming.
13. While these reasons are varied and some may be rational in the means-ends 
sense, nearly all are anti-globalization. The homepage of one website promi-
nently features the statement that
You can support our regional economy by purchasing goods and prod-
ucts that are grown, crafted, and manufactured in our region. When 
you buy goods made by local workers and craftsmen your money stays 
in the community. The businesses you support in turn pay local work-
ers, pay local taxes, use local services and contribute to the community 
in a variety of ways. (LocalGoods.org, n.d.)
Here, it is also perhaps worthwhile to note the presence of make-work bias 
found in the statement.
14. Though, it must be stressed again, this is all taking place on private markets.
15. It may be impossible to purchase all goods at only a 20% premium. This limi-
tation is acknowledged, but some simplification must be made to calculate an 
estimate.
16. Using survey data, the authors break the respondents into four categories: 
adventurous, rational, conservative-uninvolved, and careless. The adventurous 
group includes those who are most likely to purchase local food. The rational 
group was likely as well. Within the adventurous group, the poor and the high 
middle income were statistically less likely than the middle income to purchase 
local food. Within the rational group, the low-middle income were statistically 
less likely than the middle income to purchase local food. The conservative-
uninvolved and careless were less likely to purchase local food and income did 
not statistically have an effect on whether or not they would.
17. Although US$0.20 per pound and 7.9 pounds of coffee per year sounds small 
at the individual level, keep in mind this averages in non-coffee drinkers. The 
amount would increase if the non-coffee drinkers were not included.
18. The presence of the selective discount suggests traditional signaling may also 
be at work here. This is possible, but may not be the entire story.
19. Other similar irrational behaviors include homeopathic medicine (see Shang 
et al., 2005; Vandenbroucke, 2005), detoxification (c.f. Chen and Chen, 1989; 
Ernst, 1997; Zeratsky, n.d.), and consuming raw milk (Headrick et al., 1998; 
Tauxe, 2011).
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20. The 78,000 Euro estimate came from a study measuring air pollution health 
risks. The high estimate was on automobile safety.
21. It is not clear from Deshazo and Cameron the exact date of the data which led 
to this result. I assumed the year of the manucript.
22. For more on the sensitivity of these analyses, see Cameron and DeShazo 
(2013).
23. Chickenpox may be taken less seriously by laypeople because of their familiar-
ity with it. However, the data cited here are approximately comparable to the 
other diseases because it is only including cases that were severe enough to 
require hospitalization. For these cases, Daley and Glanz (2011) note,
Depending on fate to soften the blow from an infection is also more dangerous 
than most people realize… [C]hicken pox can lead to severe infections of the 
skin, swelling of the brain, and pneumonia. Even when no complications arise, 
chicken pox is painful and triggers high fevers and itchy rashes. Vaccinated 
children who develop chicken pox (no vaccine is perfectly effective all the 
time) usually suffer much milder symptoms.
24. There are a few points of note for the demand curve presented in Figure 2. I pre-
sent the “quantity” as the approximate percentage of individuals willing-to-pay 
for various “goods” in the United States. This does not seem too distant from 
the spirit of Caplan’s original market for irrationality graphs, especially when 
thought of in terms of demands for irrationality aggregated and reflecting specific 
policy opinions. Second, as noted in Figure 2, two of the estimates are average 
willingnesses-to-pay, which most naturally are placed as representative of 100% 
of the market, although each of these WTP would have its own demand curve.
25. Data Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis: Velocity of M1 Monetary Stock (M1V); Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M1V/; accessed 7 July 2012.
26. Data are readily available for how many total Berkshares have been issued, but 
the current value of the quantity in circulation is difficult to find.
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Appendix 1
Pinker’s list of the newly moralized
Advertising to children, automobile safety, Barbie dolls, “big box” chain 
stores, cheesecake photos, clothing from Third World factories, consumer 
product safety, corporate-owned farms, defense-funded research; disposa-
ble diapers, disposable packaging, ethnic jokes, executive salaries, fast 
food, flirtation in the workplace, food additives, fur, hydroelectric dams, IQ 
tests, logging, mining, nuclear power, oil drilling, owning certain stocks, 
poultry farming, public holidays (Columbus Day, Martin Luther King Day), 
research on AIDS, research on breast cancer, spanking, suburbia (“sprawl”), 
sugar, tax cuts, toy guns, violence on television, and weight of fashion mod-
els (Pinker, 2002: 276).
Appendix 2
Potter’s list of goods marketed as authentic
Italian cuisine; Chinese cuisine; Ethiopian cuisine; American cuisine; 
Canadian cuisine; Coca-Cola; Bailey’s Irish Cream; distressed jeans; dis-
tressed guitars; skateboards; skateboarding shoes; books; independent 
bookstores; typewriters; chainsaws; Twitter; crowdsourcing; blogs; com-
ments on blogs; ecotourism; communist tourism; slum tourism; Al Gore; 
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John McCain; Sarah Palin; Barack Obama; Susan Boyle; Michael Phelps’ 
mom; the Mini Cooper; the Volkswagen Beetle; botox; baseball; Samuel 
Adams beer; Russian vodka; English gin; French wine; Cuban chocolate; 
Cuba; Bhutan; organic coffee; organic produce; local grown produce; 
locally grown organic produce; the 100-mile diet; the 100-mile suit; urban 
lofts; urban lofts with no-flush toilets; and mud floors in suburban homes 
(Potter, 2010: 103).
Appendix 3
Willingness-to-pay calculations for irrationality in Berkshares
To estimate this, we can use the elasticity of income with respect to trade. 








The variable of interest is δY , and we know or can estimate all the other 
variables. Y in 2007 was US$5,446,543,000, using local gross domestic 
product (GDP) data of Berkshire County found in the BEA’s Regional 
Economic Accounts. In the same year, trade in Massachusetts amounted to 
6.27% of GDP, which we apply to Berkshire county (an underestimate). To 
determine δTrade , we assume that each Berkshare spent serves its stated 
purpose, which is to cut trade with the outside world, and that each Berkshare 
has the same velocity as M1 (in 2007,25 V1 was 10.06). One estimate of the 
value of Berkshares in circulation26 was US$759,600. (Malone, 2007). We 
can therefore solve for δY :
δY
$ , , ,
. *( $ , )
. *$ , , ,
.
5 446 543 000
10 06 759 600




Under these assumptions, δY  (and WTP) equals US$60,937,608. The 2007 
population of Berkshire County was 131,883, so the loss per person equals 
US$462 per person.
